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into the other, one obtains an equation that defines the optimal ratio between the two tax rates.
This equation shares the two main characteristics of (3.36). First, the optimal tax ratio does
not depend on the shape of the social welfare functional as the expression in square brackets
in (5.4) has been eliminated through the substitution. Second, the two tax rates have opposite
signs, as they bring about opposite changes in wage distribution.
Following the same steps, one can also generalise the conclusions reached under an optimal
non-linear income tax.
6. Concluding remarks
The analysis developed in the paper shows that source- and origin-based taxes are constrained-
efficient instruments in a small open economy when consumers differ in skills and the government
cannot implement the optimal differential linear taxation of labour since it cannot directly
observe individuals’ characteristics. The rationale for such taxes is quite different from the
one provided by the existing literature, which studies large open economies where source-based
taxation is seen as a substitute for residence-based taxation.
In a small open economy source- and origin-based taxes are shifted completely onto immobile
labour. Where a linear tax is levied on labour income, source- and origin-based taxes can act
as substitutes for differential taxation of labour if the various types of labour bear a different
tax burden. By contrast, if a non-linear tax is levied on labour income, source- and origin-
based taxes cannot directly improve income distribution as the two types of labour are taxed
at two different marginal rates. However, they may still improve social welfare as they relax
the self-selection constraint that binds the non-linear tax by changing the distribution of gross
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wages.
This paper provides a basis for understanding tax policies in small open economies. Further
research is needed to investigate whether actual tax-setting behaviour is consistent with the
results obtained. To this purpose, both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of source- and
origin-based tax incidence are of crucial importance.
References
[1] Arachi, G.: Optimal redistributive taxation in a small open economy: the role of source-
and origin-based taxes, IEP Working Paper TPE 1999-1, Università Bocconi, 1999.
[2] Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E.: Lectures on public economics, McGraw-Hill, Singapore,
1980.
[3] Bucovetstky, S. and Wilson, J.:Tax competition with two tax instruments, Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 167-81, 1991.
[4] Chennels, L. and Griffith, R.: Taxing profits in a changing world, IFS, London, 1997.
[5] Diamond, P. and Mirrlees, J.: Optimal taxation and public production: production effi-
ciency, American Economic Review, 8-27, 1971.
[6] Feldstein, M. S. and Horioka, C.: Domestic savings and international capital flows, The
Economic Journal, 314-29, 1980.
[7] Gerber I. R. and Hewitt, P. D: Tax competition and redistribution policy of local govern-
ments competing for business capital, Journal of Urban Economics, 69-82, 1987.
37
